Partisan heterogeneity and International Cooperation :The case of the European Development Fund / Christina J. Schneider and Johannes Urpelainen
Subject(s): In: The journal of Conflict Resolution . -- v. 58, n.1 (Feb. 2014 )Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. The authors argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments' willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts.Revista R0323 (MAEC - Biblioteca Central)
This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. The authors argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments' willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts.