The limits of counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan : the other side of the COIN / Karl W. Eikenberry
Language: English Subject(s): In: Foreign Affairs . -- v.92, n.5 (Sept-Oct 2013)Abstract: Counterinsurgency strategy, as applied in Afghanistan, rested on the assumption that it was feasible for the U.S. military to protect the Afghan population, that foreign aid could make the Afghan government more accountable, and that the Karzai administration shared U.S. goals. But all three assumptions turned out to be spectacularly incorrect.Revista R0073 (MAEC-Biblioteca Central)
Counterinsurgency strategy, as applied in Afghanistan, rested on the assumption that it was feasible for the U.S. military to protect the Afghan population, that foreign aid could make the Afghan government more accountable, and that the Karzai administration shared U.S. goals. But all three assumptions turned out to be spectacularly incorrect.